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There is an increasing interest in the entwining of the 
field of antitrust with the field of Artificial Intelligence 
(AI), frequently referred to jointly as Antitrust and AI 
(AAI) in the research literature. This study focuses on 
the synergies entangling antitrust and AI, doing so to 
extend the literature by proffering the primary ways 
that these two fields intersect, consisting of: (1) the 
application of antitrust to AI, and (2) the application of 
AI to antitrust. To date, most of the existing research 
on this intermixing has concentrated on the former, 
namely the application of antitrust to AI, entailing how 
the marketplace will be altered by the advent of AI and 
the potential for adverse antitrust behaviors arising 
accordingly. Opting to explore more deeply the other 
side of this coin, this research closely examines the 
application of AI to antitrust and establishes an 
antitrust vigilance lifecycle to which AI is predicted to 
be substantively infused for purposes of enabling and 
bolstering antitrust detection, enforcement, and post-
enforcement monitoring. Furthermore, a gradual and 
incremental injection of AI into antitrust vigilance is 
anticipated to occur as significant advances emerge 
amidst the Levels of Autonomy (LoA) for AI Legal 
Reasoning (AILR). 
Keywords: AI, artificial intelligence, autonomy, 
autonomous levels, legal reasoning, law, lawyers, 
practice of law, antitrust, competition, lifecycle 
 
1 Background on Antitrust and AI 
 
In Section 1 of this paper, the literature on Antitrust 
and AI (AAI) is introduced and addressed. Doing so 
establishes groundwork for the subsequent sections. 
Section 2 introduces the Levels of Autonomy (LoA) of 
AI Legal Reasoning (AILR), which is instrumental in 
the discussions undertaken in Section 3. This provides 
an expanded viewpoint of AAI, including articulating 
the primary way that these two fields intertwine, along 
with proffering an in-depth exploration of the 
application of AI to antitrust, along with other vital 
facets. Section 4 provides various additional research 
implications and anticipated impacts upon salient 
practice-of-law considerations. 
 
This paper then consists of these four sections: 
• Section 1: Background on Antitrust and AI 
• Section 2: Levels of Autonomy (LOA) of 
                        AI Legal Reasoning (AILR) 
• Section 3: Focus on AI Applied to Antitrust 
• Section 4: Additional Considerations and 
                 Future Research 
 
1.1 Overview of Antitrust and AI 
 
An expanding field of substantive interest for the 
theory of the law and the practice-of-law entails 
Antitrust and AI (commonly referred to as AAI). To 
some degree, there are expressed qualms that the 
antitrust community has been slow to adopt and 
consider the ramifications of AI [18] [34] [47] [69] 
[77] [81]. 
 
In Section 3, we address the aspect that there are two 
major forms of synergy between antitrust and AI, 
consisting of the application of antitrust to AI, and the 
application of AI to antitrust. 
 
Per the research by Deng [18], attention to-date has 
appeared to primarily concentrate on the application of 
antitrust to AI. This includes the overarching concern 
that businesses adopting AI will be able to collude in a 
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manner and degree not previously envisioned, and for 
which then promotes and accelerates antitrust 
behaviors in the marketplace. 
 
According to Deng [18], there are at least two avenues 
for this kind of considered anticompetitive behavior as 
prodded via the use of AI:  
 
“In the antitrust community, the recent interest in AI 
is also driven in part by concerns about algorithmic 
collusion. At least two ways in which computer 
algorithms could facilitate collusion have been 
identified. First, computer algorithms could be used 
to implement a price-fixing agreement, e.g., an 
agreed-upon price or production level or automating 
the detection of “cheating” and retaliation.”  
 
And the other means is [18]:  
 
“This is an important observation because the 
antitrust community is also concerned with another 
type of much more sophisticated algorithmic 
collusion, i.e., the possibility that algorithms could 
ultimately learn to collude without human 
facilitation.” 
 
A crucial meta-perspective on this preceding point is 
that the AI can either be established in a means to be 
directed by human hands while undertaking antitrust 
behaviors, plus can be ostensibly let loose via the 
inclusion of Machine Learning and Deep Learning to 
perform antitrust behaviors without a human hand at 
the wheel per se. 
 
In the research by Petit [62], there is an indication that 
this kind of antitrust behavior can be characterized in a 
threefold manner: 
 
“First, algorithms will widen instances in which 
known forms of anticompetitive conduct occurs. 
The AAI scholarship conjectures that express and 
tacit collusion, as well as almost perfect behavioral 
discrimination, will be more common. 
 
Second, algorithmic markets will display new forms 
of anticompetitive conduct in non-price dimensions 
like data capture, extraction, and co-opetition 
(between ‘super-platforms’ and applications 
developers) which challenge established antitrust 
doctrine.  
 
Third, deception is a design feature of algorithmic 
markets. Behind the ‘façade’ of competition, 
consumers are nudged in exploitative transactions.” 
 
When considering how a government will respond to 
these likely AI-enabled antitrust behaviors, the work 
of Hayashi and Arai [44] asserts that governmental 
agencies and laws will need to be reconsidered and 
possibly revamped, doing so to try and stabilize the 
marketplace playing field into one of fair and balanced 
competition in light of the leveraging of AI. 
 
One offshoot of the AAI realm involves the thorny 
question of legal liability and legally understood 
notions of intent when AI that is based on Machine 
Learning and Deep Learning is being used in 
seemingly antitrust-related ways [36]: 
 
“The consideration of the ‘autonomous agent’ raises 
ethical and policy questions on the relationship 
between humans and machines. In such instances, 
can the law attribute liability to companies for their 
computers’ actions? At what stage, if any, would the 
designer or operator relinquish responsibility over 
the acts of the machine? Evidently, defining a 
benchmark for illegality in such cases is 
challenging. It requires close consideration of the 
relevant algorithm to establish whether any illegal 
action could have been anticipated or was 
predetermined. Such review requires consideration 
of the programming of the machine, available 
safeguards, its reward structure, and the scope of its 
activities. The ability to identify the strand which is 
of direct relevance is questionable. The complexity 
of the algorithms’ data-processing and self-learning 
increases the risk that enforcers, in undertaking this 
daunting undertaking, stray far afield of rule of 
ideals, such as transparency, objectivity, 
predictability, and accuracy. Further, one must 
consider the extent to which humans may truly 
control self-learning machines.” 
 
Another variant of the focus on antitrust as applied to 
AI consists of the dimension that there is AI 
innovation that occurs in a marketplace, and a thriving 
AI developer ecosystem is presumed to be vital to the 
ongoing advancement of AI-based technologies and 
capabilities.  
 
This is another point of concern in the AAI community 
since there is a possibility that antitrust enforcement 
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could be applied toward the mechanisms of the AI 
innovation ecosystem. This use of antitrust could be 
negatively disruptive to AI advancements and 
seemingly dampen or perhaps curtail pending new AI-
based capabilities. 
 
Foster and Zachary [38] emphasize that besides the 
qualms of how this might adversely impact industry 
and the ability of businesses to employ and deploy AI, 
it could have a severe indirect and consequential 
impact on military defense readiness too: 
 
“Unlike with many prior defense technologies, the 
private sector currently drives the development of 
AI. Therefore, to use AI to America’s national 
security advantage, the Pentagon will rely in large 
part on the domestic private-sector AI ecosystem. At 
the same time, antitrust policymakers are 
contemplating significant changes to this ecosystem, 
and are even considering breaking up its largest 
companies. How would such an action affect the 
Pentagon’s AI capabilities?” 
 
By-and-large, much of the research on AAI oftentimes 
takes a particular perspective of either the considered 
downside or adverse element of antitrust as applied to 
AI, or on other occasions takes the opposite position 
that antitrust could potentially further enable AI 
advancement and adoption in the marketplace (though, 
this latter perspective is a somewhat rarer argued 
posture). 
 
In research by Rab [64], he cautions that we ought to 
be giving attention to both sides of the coin, as it were, 
and not allow ourselves to fall into the trap that one 
side or the other does not exist or is somehow 
axiomatically unworthy of balanced attention: 
 
“The AI antitrust scholarship makes a bold claim 
that AI is an enabler of tacit collusion and could 
increase the scope for anti-competitive outcomes at 
even lower levels of concentration than associated 
with antitrust orthodoxy. However, even the brief 
examination of these claims in this article has 
unearthed alternative hypotheses which need to be 
fully tested before the theory can be incorporated in 
policy and legal environments without running the 




1.2 Complexities and Vagaries of Antitrust 
 
Though antitrust might seemingly be a straightforward 
notion, the reality is that antitrust bears a great deal of 
complexity, vagary, and altogether defies any 
inarguable definitive scope and ironclad meaning. 
 
The simplest means to construe antitrust can be readily 
expressed in this manner as stated by the U.S. 
Department of Justice (DOJ) [82]: 
 
“The U.S. antitrust laws represent the legal 
embodiment of our nation’s commitment to a free 
market economy in which the competitive process 
of the market ensures the most efficient allocation of 
our scarce resources and the maximization of 
consumer welfare.” 
 
Furthermore, the antitrust process to presumably carry 
out that mission is indicated in this way by the DOJ: 
 
“The Antitrust Division’s mission is to promote 
economic competition through enforcing and 
providing guidance on antitrust laws and principles. 
When it comes to enforcement, the Division’s 
policy, in general, is to proceed by criminal 
investigation and prosecution in cases involving 
horizontal, “per se” unlawful agreements such as 
price fixing, bid rigging, and market allocation. 
Civil process and, if necessary, civil prosecution is 
used with respect to other suspected antitrust 
violations, including those that require analysis 
under the “rule of reason,” as well as some offenses 
that historically have been labeled “per se” by the 
courts. There are a number of situations where, 
although the conduct may appear to be a “per se” 
violation of law, criminal investigation or 
prosecution may not be appropriate. These situations 
may include cases in which (1) the case law is 
unsettled or uncertain; or (2) there are truly novel 
issues of law or fact presented.” 
 
There is a kind of triad associated with the antitrust 
efforts in the U.S. [49], consisting of (1) the laws that 
are devised by the courts, (2) the prosecutorial efforts 
of the DOJ and similarly antitrust-tasked agencies, and 
(3) the funding to those government agencies for the 
purposes of taking on antitrust activities including 




Consider how the triad interacts amongst the three 
components, akin to a three-legged stool that requires 
all three legs, demonstrably aligned to be able to stand 
upright.  
 
If there are insufficient laws or laws that are seen as 
weak toward antitrust behaviors, presumably the triad 
is accordingly undercut. If the government agencies 
tasked with antitrust opt to not pursue antitrust 
behaviors, even if there are sufficient laws to warrant 
such pursuit, this presumably undercuts the antitrust 
policing. And, even if the government agencies are 
desirous of such pursuits, and the laws are in place, 
without adequate antitrust-related funding the result is 
a mere hollow aspiration waiting to be fulfilled. 
 
As Kades at Yale University stated [49]: 
 
“The effectiveness of the U.S. antitrust laws in 
protecting competition depends on the three key 
factors. The first is jurisprudential doctrines that 
courts develop. The second is the prosecutorial 
discretion that enforcers—the Antitrust Division of 
the Department of Justice, the Federal Trade 
Commission, and state attorneys general—employ. 
And the third is the fiscal resources provided to the 
enforcers. It can be difficult to disentangle the role 
of these factors. The federal government, for 
example, may bring fewer antitrust cases because it 
has changed its enforcement philosophy. Or a 
judicial decision may limit the reach of the antitrust 
laws by limiting the government’s ability to 
challenge certain types of cases. Similarly, a change 
in enforcement discretion or the courts broadening 
the scope of the antitrust law could lead to increased 
enforcement. Indirectly, judicial or evidentiary rules 
that increase the cost of successfully pursuing cases 
can reduce the number of antitrust cases (and the 
reverse could increase it). Increasing or decreasing 
appropriations for the antitrust enforcement agencies 
also can affect both the degree of antitrust 
enforcement and its impact.” 
 
A core deficiency underlying the entire premise of 
antitrust is that there is an axiomatic means to 
ascertain whether a marketplace is being anti-
competitively overrun. Not everyone concurs that 
there is some form of calculus or infallible method of 
ascertaining the competitive versus anti-competitive 
conjecture. 
 
Per the rather sharp toothed remarks of Stigler [73]:  
 
“Economists have their glories, but I do not believe 
that antitrust law is one of them.” 
 
This claim, which some might find alarming, or 
possibly unfounded, he supports via this indication 
[73]: 
 
“In a series of studies done in the early 1970s, 
economists assumed that important losses to 
consumers from limits on competition existed, and 
constructed models to identify the markets where 
these losses would be greatest. Then they compared 
the markets where government was enforcing 
antitrust laws with the markets where 
governments should enforce the laws if consumer 
well-being was the government’s paramount 
concern. The studies concluded unanimously that 
the size of consumer losses from monopoly played 
little or no role in government enforcement of the 
law.” 
 
There is a lot at stake when considering that the very 
act or activity of potential governmental intervention is 
seemingly bereft of preciseness and not amenable to 
widespread understanding, thus putting businesses into 
the unenviable position of presumably not being able 
to gauge what the rules of the game really are (with 
respect to what is deemed as antitrust behavior). 
 
Consider these salient points about how the ambiguity 
of what antitrust consists of can be both a blessing and 
a curse to the marketplace [20]: 
 
“A fundamental difficulty facing the court is the 
incommensurability of the stakes. If the court errs 
by condemning a beneficial practice, the benefits 
may be lost for good. Any other firm that uses the 
condemned practice faces sanctions in the name of 
stare decisis, no matter the benefits. If the court errs 
by permitting a deleterious practice, though, the 
welfare loss decreases over time. The legal system 
should be designed to minimize the total costs of (1) 
anticompetitive practices that escape condemnation; 
(2) competitive practices that are condemned or 
deterred; and (3) the system itself. The third is 
easiest to understand. Some practices, although 
anticompetitive, are not worth deterring. We do not 
hold three-week trials about parking tickets. And 
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when we do seek to deter, we want to do so at the 
least cost.” 
 
All told, per [20] the assumption that antitrust is a 
handy or helpful tool is raft with falsehood since the 
antitrust looming threat of enforcement can 
undermine the marketplace, just as anti-competitive 
behavior can undermine the marketplace: 
 
“Antitrust is an imperfect tool for the regulation 
of competition. Imperfect because we rarely know 
the right amount of competition there should be, 
because neither judges nor juries are particularly 
good at handling complex economic arguments, 
and because many plaintiffs are interested in 
restraining rather than promoting competition.” 
 
 
1.3  Due Process and Antitrust 
 
If antitrust is potentially an ill-devised tool or at least 
an imperfect one, the question of due process and 
fairness certainly enters into the picture. 
 
First, consider the importance of the rule of law [88]:  
 
“The rule of law is one of the founding principles of 
the United States of America and has shaped U.S. 
legal thinking and practice in many areas. The basic 
idea is simple: the people and their actions are not 
governed and regulated by arbitrary decisionmakers, 
but by a set of rules that serves as a check against 
potential abuses of power.” 
 
And, the rule of law is especially vital when 
considering antitrust enforcement [88]:  
 
“Due process and fairness are particularly important 
in antitrust enforcement. Because the U.S. was the 
first country to enact an antitrust law, it has enjoyed 
the greatest opportunity to develop its enforcement 
practices.” 
 
One perspective is that the government will act in a 
rationalized and non-politically motivated way, 
presumably rooting out antitrust behaviors in an 
unbiased manner. This belies though the reality that 
the politics of the day can readily be interjected into 
antitrust oversight and enforcement actions. 
 
Indeed, the recent work by Schrepel points out that to 
some extent there is an emerging semblance of 
romanticizing of antitrust, pitting the technology elites 
against the public-at-large, doing so in a politically 
divined shroud [71]: 
 
“Increasing romanticization could critically 
jeopardize decades of jurisprudential construction, 
causing economic disruption, destabilization of the 
law, and blindness towards real anti-competitive 
practices on the part of antitrust authorities, 
consequently placing the rule of law at risk.” 
 
It is altogether conceivable and perhaps patently 
obvious to some that the antitrust notion can be 
wielded as a somehow neutralized axiom that seeks to 
optimize competition and prevent the usurping of a 
marketplace by antitrust behaviors, meanwhile, the 
antitrust arm-twisting power-punching capacity can be 
exercised by politicians that have a particular political 
gain in mind. 
 
Succinctly stated by McChesney [57]:  
 
“If public-interest rationales do not explain antitrust, 
what does? A final set of studies has shown 
empirically that patterns of antitrust enforcement are 
motivated at least in part by political pressures 
unrelated to aggregate economic welfare. For 
example, antitrust is useful to politicians in stopping 
mergers that would result in plant closings or job 
transfers in their home districts.” 
 
Yet another consideration of the efficacy of antitrust as 
a governmental tool involves the nature of innovation 
itself and how it fares or evolves in the marketplace. 
One argument to be made is that AI, in particular, 
needs as much latitude as possible at this time to 
properly percolate and mature, for which a heavy-
handed antitrust clash might disturb (this was earlier 
pointed out in the remarks about the Pentagon and 
reliance on AI innovation arising from industry). 
 
A cornerstone research paper by Schrepel [72], defines 
and proffers that we need to encapsulate predatory 
innovation into the vernacular of antitrust law:  
 
“In fact, the terms of predatory innovation—which 
the author defines as the alteration of one or more 
technical elements of a product to limit or eliminate 
competition—describes all practices that, under the 
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guise of real innovations, are anti-competitive 
strategies aimed at eliminating competition without 
benefiting consumers.” 
 
This provides yet another important consideration 
when weighing the antitrust triad and how it proceeds. 
 
 
1.4  Applying AI to Antitrust 
 
The preceding subsections have focused on the realm 
of AAI that deals with the application of antitrust to 
AI, and as explained earlier in Subsection 1.1, 
ostensibly has received the preponderance of attention 
in the AAI research literature to-date. 
 
Shifting the focus to the other side of the coin, we next 
consider the application of AI to antitrust. This will 
also become the bulk of the attention in Section 3 and 
as based on the contextual background provided in 
Section 2. 
 
A recent study by Engstrom, Ho, Sharkey, and Cuellar 
examined how AI is being used by federal agencies 
[35]: 
 
“Artificial intelligence (AI) promises to transform 
how government agencies do their work. Rapid 
developments in AI have the potential to reduce the 
cost of core governance functions, improve the 
quality of decisions, and unleash the power of 
administrative data, thereby making government 
performance more efficient and effective. Agencies 
that use AI to realize these gains will also confront 
important questions about the proper design of 
algorithms and user interfaces, the respective scope 
of human and machine decision-making, the 
boundaries between public actions and private 
contracting, their own capacity to learn over time 
using AI, and whether the use of AI is even 
permitted.” 
 
There have been sparse and spotty efforts to 
incorporate AI into governmental antitrust efforts. This 
is perhaps handy since it implies a rife potential for an 
evergreen approach to applying AI into antirust. At the 
same time, the adoption of AI into antitrust efforts 
could be undertaken with haphazard attention, 
producing either mismanaged results or worse still 
leading to antitrust that is overtaken by unsavory AI.  
 
There is an ongoing concern that AI is at times 
implemented without proper controls and monitoring. 
Qualms too are that AI in governmental agencies 
might be lacking in explainability or interpretability 
(having AI that can explain its actions is typically 
referred to as XAI, see [21] [22] [23]). 
 
A well-taken advisory caution by [35] emphasizes the 
importance of properly applying AI to governmental 
uses:  
 
“Managed well, algorithmic governance tools can 
modernize public administration, promoting more 
efficient, accurate, and equitable forms of state 
action. Managed poorly, government deployment of 
AI tools can hollow out the human expertise inside 
agencies with few compensating gains, widen the 
public-private technology gap, increase undesirable 
opacity in public decision-making, and heighten 
concerns about arbitrary government action and 
power. Given these stakes, agency administrators, 
judges, technologists, legislators, and academics 
should think carefully about how to spur 
government innovation involving the appropriate 
use of AI tools while ensuring accountability in their 
acquisition and use.” 
 
Section 2 will introduce the principles underlying AI 
Legal Reasoning and the various levels of autonomy 
therein. Section 3 then continues this herein discussion 
about applying AI to antitrust and does so in light of 
the aforementioned cautionary insights about the 
adoption of AI in governmental agencies. 
 
 
2 Levels of Autonomy (LOA) of AI Legal 
Reasoning (AILR) 
 
In this section, a framework for the autonomous levels 
of AI Legal Reasoning is summarized and is based on 
the research described in detail in Eliot [23] [24] [25] 
[26] [27] [28] [29]. 
 
These autonomous levels will be portrayed in a grid 
that aligns with key elements of autonomy and as 
matched to AI Legal Reasoning. Providing this context 
will be useful to the later sections of this paper and 





The autonomous levels of AI Legal Reasoning are as 
follows: 
Level 0: No Automation for AI Legal Reasoning 
Level 1: Simple Assistance Automation for AI Legal Reasoning 
Level 2: Advanced Assistance Automation for AI Legal Reasoning 
Level 3: Semi-Autonomous Automation for AI Legal Reasoning 
Level 4: Domain Autonomous for AI Legal Reasoning 
Level 5: Fully Autonomous for AI Legal Reasoning 
Level 6: Superhuman Autonomous for AI Legal Reasoning 
 
2.1 Details of the LoA AILR 
 
See Figure A-1 for an overview chart showcasing the 
autonomous levels of AI Legal Reasoning as via 
columns denoting each of the respective levels. 
 
See Figure A-2 for an overview chart similar to Figure 
A-1 which alternatively is indicative of the 
autonomous levels of AI Legal Reasoning via the rows 
as depicting the respective levels (this is simply a 
reformatting of Figure A-1, doing so to aid in 
illuminating this variant perspective, but does not 
introduce any new facets or alterations from the 
contents as already shown in Figure A-1). 
 
2.1.1 Level 0: No Automation for AI Legal 
Reasoning 
 
Level 0 is considered the no automation level. Legal 
reasoning is carried out via manual methods and 
principally occurs via paper-based methods.  
 
This level is allowed some leeway in that the use of 
say a simple handheld calculator or perhaps the use of 
a fax machine could be allowed or included within this 
Level 0, though strictly speaking it could be said that 
any form whatsoever of automation is to be excluded 
from this level. 
 
2.1.2 Level 1: Simple Assistance Automation 
for AI Legal Reasoning 
 
Level 1 consists of simple assistance automation for 
AI legal reasoning.  
 
Examples of this category encompassing simple 
automation would include the use of everyday 
computer-based word processing, the use of everyday 
computer-based spreadsheets, access to online legal 
documents that are stored and retrieved electronically, 
and so on. 
 
By-and-large, today’s use of computers for legal 
activities is predominantly within Level 1. It is 
assumed and expected that over time, the 
pervasiveness of automation will continue to deepen 
and widen, and eventually lead to legal activities being 
supported and within Level 2, rather than Level 1. 
 
2.1.3 Level 2: Advanced Assistance Automation 
for AI Legal Reasoning 
 
Level 2 consists of advanced assistance automation for 
AI legal reasoning. 
 
Examples of this notion encompassing advanced 
automation would include the use of query-style 
Natural Language Processing (NLP), Machine 
Learning (ML) for case predictions, and so on. 
 
Gradually, over time, it is expected that computer-
based systems for legal activities will increasingly 
make use of advanced automation. Law industry 
technology that was once at a Level 1 will likely be 
refined, upgraded, or expanded to include advanced 
capabilities, and thus be reclassified into Level 2. 
 
2.1.4 Level 3: Semi-Autonomous Automation 
for AI Legal Reasoning 
 
Level 3 consists of semi-autonomous automation for 
AI legal reasoning.  
 
Examples of this notion encompassing semi-
autonomous automation would include the use of 
Knowledge-Based Systems (KBS) for legal reasoning, 
the use of Machine Learning and Deep Learning 
(ML/DL) for legal reasoning, and so on. 
 
Today, such automation tends to exist in research 
efforts or prototypes and pilot systems, along with 
some commercial legal technology that has been 
infusing these capabilities too.  
 
2.1.5 Level 4: Domain Autonomous for AI 
Legal Reasoning 
 
Level 4 consists of domain autonomous computer-




This level reuses the conceptual notion of Operational 
Design Domains (ODDs) as utilized in the 
autonomous vehicles and self-driving cars' levels of 
autonomy, though in this use case it is being applied to 
the legal domain [24] [25] [26] [27]. Essentially, this 
entails any AI legal reasoning capacities that can 
operate autonomously, entirely so, but that is only able 
to do so in some limited or constrained legal domain. 
 
2.1.6 Level 5: Fully Autonomous for AI Legal 
Reasoning 
 
Level 5 consists of fully autonomous computer-based 
systems for AI legal reasoning. 
 
In a sense, Level 5 is the superset of Level 4 in terms 
of encompassing all possible domains as per however 
so defined ultimately for Level 4. The only constraint, 
as it were, consists of the facet that the Level 4 and 
Level 5 are concerning human intelligence and the 
capacities thereof. This is an important emphasis due 
to attempting to distinguish Level 5 from Level 6 (as 
will be discussed in the next subsection) 
 
It is conceivable that someday there might be a fully 
autonomous AI legal reasoning capability, one that 
encompasses all of the law in all foreseeable ways, 
though this is quite a tall order and remains quite 
aspirational without a clear-cut path of how this might 
one day be achieved. Nonetheless, it seems to be 
within the extended realm of possibilities, which is 
worthwhile to mention in relative terms to Level 6. 
 
2.1.7 Level 6: Superhuman Autonomous for AI 
Legal Reasoning 
 
Level 6 consists of superhuman autonomous 
computer-based systems for AI legal reasoning. 
 
In a sense, Level 6 is the entirety of Level 5 and adds 
something beyond that in a manner that is currently ill-
defined and perhaps (some would argue) as yet 
unknowable. The notion is that AI might ultimately 
exceed human intelligence, rising to become 
superhuman, and if so, we do not yet have any viable 
indication of what that superhuman intelligence 
consists of and nor what kind of thinking it would 
somehow be able to undertake. 
 
Whether a Level 6 is ever attainable is reliant upon 
whether superhuman AI is ever attainable, and thus, at 
this time, this stands as a placeholder for that which 
might never occur. In any case, having such a 
placeholder provides a semblance of completeness, 
doing so without necessarily legitimatizing that 
superhuman AI is going to be achieved or not. No such 
claim or dispute is undertaken within this framework. 
 
 
3   Focus on AI Applied to Antitrust 
 
In this Section 3, various aspects of Antitrust and 
Artificial Intelligence (AAI) will be identified and 
discussed, particularly with respect to two key 
elements: (1) Establishing an AAI Antitrust Vigilance 
Lifecycle, and (2) AAI and the Levels of Autonomy in 
AI Legal Reasoning (AILR).  
 
A series of diagrams and illustrations are included to 
aid in depicting the points being made. In addition, the 
material draws upon the background and research 
literature indicated in Section 1 and combines with the 
material outlined in Section 2 on the Levels of 
Autonomy of AI Legal Reasoning. 
 
3.1 AAI Overview 
 
There is a synergistic aspect to antitrust and the field 
of Artificial Intelligence. In some respects, antitrust 
can be applied to AI, while in other respects AI can be 
applied to antitrust. 
 
See Figure B-1. 
 
As shown, there is a cyclical way to cast the roles of 
antitrust and AI. You can assert that in certain ways 
there is the impact of antitrust upon AI, or more 
properly phrased the advent of AI. You can also assert 
that in particular ways there is an impact of AI upon 
antitrust, primarily regarding the use or application of 
AI in antitrust efforts. 
 
Let’s consider some examples associated with these 
in-common interactions. 
 
See Figure B-2. 
 
As an example of antitrust being applied to AI, 
consider that as discussed in Section 1 there is ample 
debate about the notion that businesses will make use 
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of AI and thus potentially spur antitrust behaviors. 
Meanwhile, the counterargument is that AI used by 
businesses will disrupt the chances of undertaking 
antitrust behaviors. Of course, the reality is likely 
going to be that AI has a dual impact, for which in 
some instances antitrust behaviors will be sparked 
while in other instances antitrust behaviors will be 
lessened or ostensibly subverted via the use of AI in a 
marketplace. 
 
For further illustration, see Figure B-3. 
 
Another example of antitrust impacting or being 
applied to AI consists of the qualm that perhaps 
antitrust enforcement will dampen AI progress. This 
was also discussed in Section 1. Again, the impact of 
antitrust on AI does not necessarily need to be in one 
direction only. There is a possibility that antitrust 
enforcement, or the lack thereof, could accelerate the 
progress of AI. Likely, the use of antitrust enforcement 
is bound to have both an encouraging effect on the AI 
innovation ecosystem and simultaneously a dampening 
effect, dependent upon how the antitrust efforts are 
guided and utilized. 
 
For further illustration, see Figure B-4. 
 
In terms of applying AI to antitrust, this is the 
mainstay of the rest of this discussion and consists of 
establishing that AI can and will undoubtedly be 
integrated into antitrust efforts. 
 
See Figure B-5. 
 
This is coined as the use of AI to increase or bolster 
antitrust vigilance. 
 
As an aside on terminology, typically, the process of 
antitrust efforts are usually referred to as antitrust 
enforcement. Here, we use instead the phrasing of 
antitrust vigilance.  
 
The reason or rationale that antitrust vigilance is used 
rather than “enforcement” involves several significant 
points.  
 
First, the enforcement of antitrust is oftentimes 
perceived as the latter part of the overall lifecycle 
associated with antitrust efforts (the lifecycle will be 
identified and explored in a moment). The application 
of AI to antitrust efforts will not be confined to only 
the enforcement portion of the lifecycle and will 
instead be applicable throughout the entire lifecycle. 
Thus, a sound basis for avoiding referring to the 
application of AI as to antitrust enforcement is to 
avoid the misconception that AI would only be applied 
to a segment or subset of the lifecycle. 
 
Secondly, there is a connotation of the word 
“enforcement” that seems ominous and conjures 
imagery of an onerous nature. In theory, enforcement 
is merely the act of enforcing or ensuring that the 
antitrust laws are being legally obeyed. Nonetheless, 
there is a stigma associated with the notion of 
enforcement. If the application of AI to antitrust 
efforts is to take hold, there is a chance that a backlash 
could develop simply on the basis that it would seem 
unfair or unreasonable to use AI as a form of an 
enforcer per se. Though indeed AI is going to be used 
to aid in enforcing the antitrust laws, there would be a 
too easy assumption that AI is somehow overstepping 
appropriate bounds and being used in some revengeful 
or overzealous way. We avoid this confusion by 
referring to vigilance instead.  
 
That being said, do not overstep this indication by also 
assuming that the use of AI might not be in fact 
overzealously utilized and in some respects become a 
kind of doomsday antitrust enforcer. There is a quite 
real possibility that AI if poorly or inadequately 
devised, could become an antitrust zealot that 
overreaches. To that degree, the forewarning of the 
word “enforcer” and its connotations does provide 
some benefit for use, though on the whole, it seems 
prudent for now to refer to these matters as one of 
vigilance.  
 
In short, the phrasing of antitrust vigilance does away 
with those aforementioned qualms about the use of the 
word enforcement. AI is going to increase antitrust 
vigilance, for which the “enforcement” element is 
encompassed. 
 
3.2 Antitrust Winnowing Funnel 
 
Another facet of noteworthiness about antitrust and the 
vigilance process consists of the antitrust winnowing 
funnel. 
 




As shown, there is a funnel that starts in a wide 
manner and gradually winnows antitrust candidates 
until there is a narrower set considered viable for 
antitrust enforcement. 
 
There is a continual effort of scrutinizing the 
marketplace for potential antitrust behaviors. This 
search is ongoing and wide. The odds are that most of 
the suspected or considered antitrust targets will fall 
out of the funnel due to a lack of sufficiently credible 
indication of their alleged antitrust deeds. 
 
At each step forward in the funnel, those candidate 
firms that are seemingly more likely to have 
performed antitrust behavior will presumably be 
increasingly examined and assessed. In theory, only 
those firms meeting some level of threshold or degree 
will continue into the funnel to the point of actual 
enforcement. 
 
This brings up via implication that there is a potential 
lifecycle associated with these antitrust pursuits, which 
is indeed the case and will be explored in the next 
subsection. 
 
3.3 AAI Vigilance Lifecycle 
 
There is an antitrust vigilance lifecycle, and it provides 
crucial insight about the nature of the antitrust 
processes and also serves as a means to overlay the 
application of AI onto the antitrust realm. 
 
See Figure B-7. 
 
As shown, there are six key phases (some refer to 










The Detect phase entails the widest part of the antitrust 
winnowing funnel and consists of an ongoing and 
persistent antitrust pursuit by observing marketplaces 
for signs of antitrust behaviors. There is plenty of 
voluminous signals and indications that need to be 
detected and distilled. This also has to be taking place 
persistently since the marketplace itself is dynamic and 
ever-changing.  
 
For those spotted or anticipated potential antitrust 
behaviors, the next phase comes into play, namely the 
Assess phase. An assessment requires additional 
resources and therefore should be undertaken only 
when the Detect has identified viable candidates or 
targets for closer inspection. 
 
Out of the assessment phase, there will be antitrust 
targets or candidates that are ascertained as worthwhile 
for even greater scrutiny and will therefore be 
funneled into the Investigate phase. 
 
For underlying details associated with these processes 
and phases, the United States Department of Justice 
(DOJ) Antitrust Division Manual [82] provides an 
essential grounding in the details of these antitrust 
pursuit activities. 
 
Based on the outcome of the Investigate phase, there 
will be some candidates or targets that are funneled 
into the Recommend phase. This will then consist of a 
formal recommendation for a civil or criminal case to 
be opened and undertaken. 
 
Out of the recommended set, there will be some 
candidates or targets that are then prosecuted, thus the 
Prosecute phase. Finally, depending upon the outcome 
of the prosecution, there is likely to be a need to 
implement the result, doing so via monitoring for 
compliance and also taking added follow-up action if 
compliance falters or is not observed. 
 
These six phases can be overlaid onto the antitrust 
winnowing funnel. 
 
See Figure B-8. 
 
We can now more broadly discuss the nature of AI 
being applied to antitrust vigilance, having set the 
table, as it were, by having established a viable context 
for understanding the fuller picture of the matter at 
hand. 
 
Various aspects of AI will be applied to each of the six 
phases of the antitrust vigilance lifecycle. 
 
Not all of the lifecycle phases will be injected with AI 
in the same manner and nor at the same pace. This is 
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an important point. In particular, some researchers 
have blandly indicated that AI will be applied to 
antitrust efforts, though that is a quite overreaching 
indication and treats the antitrust process as a 
monolith. Similarly, in an inappropriate manner, AI is 
treated as a monolith, as though the mere reference to 
AI is tantamount to having some particular meaning, 
when in fact the notion of AI is an umbrella or 
collective of various technologies. 
 
See Figure B-9. 
 
As shown, AI can be considered as consisting of these 
overarching areas of technologies: 
• Machine Learning (ML) 
• Knowledge-Based Systems (KBS) 
• Natural Language Processing (NLP) 
• Computer Vision (CV) 
• Robotics/Autonomy 
• Common-Sense Reasoning 
• Other Technologies 
 
Each of those distinct areas of AI technologies will be 
gradually applied to antitrust, doing so across the 
antitrust vigilance lifecycle. 
 
A grid is envisioned that would encompass the AI 
Technologies aligned with each of the six phases, such 
that it would be feasible to indicate the depth of 
coverage by each of the AI Technologies for each of 
the respective six phases. Such a grid would be 
updated over time as the infusion of AI into the 
antitrust vigilance lifecycle matures. 
Speaking of the maturity aspects, the inclusion of AI 
into the antitrust vigilance lifecycle will significantly 
different depending upon the level of autonomy 
associated with AI. 
 
In Section 2, a framework was provided to depict the 
levels of autonomy associated with AI-based legal 
reasoning. This provides a basis for next exploring the 
application of AI to antitrust in the context of the 
maturation of AI across the levels of autonomy. 
 
3.4   AAI and AILR 
 
The nature and capabilities of applied AAI will vary 
across the Levels of Autonomy for AI Legal 
Reasoning.  
 
Refer to Figure B-10. 
 
As indicated, applied AAI becomes increasingly more 
sophisticated and advanced as the AI Legal Reasoning 
increases in capability. To aid in typifying the 
differences between each of the Levels in terms of the 
incremental advancement of applied AAI, the 
following phrasing is used: 
• Level 0: n/a 
• Level 1: Rudimentary (simplistic) 
• Level 2: Complex (simplistic) 
• Level 3: Symbolic Intermixed 
• Level 4: Domain Incisive 
• Level 5: Holistic Incisive 
• Level 6: Pansophic Incisive 
 
Briefly, each of the levels is described next. 
 
At Level 0, there is an indication of “n/a” at Level 0 
since there is no AI capability at Level 0 (the No 
Automation level of the LoA). 
 
At Level 1, the LoA is Rudimentary (simplistic) and 
this can be used to undertake applied AAI though it is 
rated or categorized as being rudimentary and making 
use of relatively simplistic calculative models and 
formulas. Thus, this is coined as “Rudimentary 
(Simplistic).” 
 
At Level 2, the LoA is Advanced Assistance 
Automation and the applied AAI is coined as 
“Complex (Simplistic),” which is indicative of AAI 
being performed in a more advanced manner than at 
Level 1. This consists of complex statistical methods 
such as those techniques mentioned in Section 1 of this 
paper. To date, most of the research and practical use 
of applied AAI has been within Level 2. Future efforts 
are aiming at Level 3 and above. 
 
At Level 3, the LoA is Semi-Autonomous Automation 
and the applied AAI is coined as “Symbolic 
Intermixed,” which can undertake AAI at an even 
more advanced capacity than at Level 2. Recall, in 
Level 2, the focus tended to be on traditional 
numerical formulations, albeit sophisticated in the use 
of statistical models. In Level 3, the symbolic 
capability is added and fostered, including at times 
acting in a hybrid mode with the conventional 
numerical and statistical models. Generally, the work 
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at Level 3 to-date has primarily been experimental, 
making use of exploratory prototypes or pilot efforts. 
 
At Level 4, the LoA is AILR Domain Autonomous and 
the applied AAI coined as “Domain Incisive,” 
meaning that this can be used to perform AAI within 
particular specialties of domains or subdomains of the 
legal field but does not necessarily cut across the 
various domains and is not intended to be able to do 
so. The capacity is done in a highly advanced manner, 
incorporating the Level 3 capabilities, along with 
exceeding those levels and providing a more fluent 
and capable perceptive means. 
 
At Level 5, the LoA is AILR Fully Autonomous, and 
the applied coined as “Holistic Incisive,” meaning that 
the use of AAI can go across all domains and 
subdomains of the legal field. The capacity is done in a 
highly advanced manner, incorporating the Level 4 
capabilities, along with exceeding those levels and 
providing a more fluent and capable perceptive means. 
 
At Level 6, the LoA is AILR Superhuman 
Autonomous, which as a reminder from Section 2 is 
not a capability that exists and might not exist, though 
it is included as a provision in case such a capability is 
ever achieved. In any case, the applied AAI at this 
level is considered “Pansophic Incisive” and would 
encapsulate the Level 5 capabilities, and then go 




4 Additional Considerations and Future Research 
 
As earlier indicated, efforts to undertake the antitrust 
lifecycle have historically been performed by human 
hand and cognition, and only thinly aided in more 
recent times by the use of computer-based approaches.  
 
Advances in Artificial Intelligence (AI) involving 
especially Natural Language Processing (NLP) and 
Machine Learning (ML) are increasingly bolstering 
how automation can systematically aid antitrust 
efforts. This research paper has examined the evolving 
infusion of AI into AAI, along with showcasing how 
the Levels of Autonomy (LoA) of AI Legal Reasoning 
(AILR) will impact this application. 
 
Artificial Intelligence (AI) based approaches have 
been increasingly utilized and will undoubtedly have a 
pronounced impact on how antitrust is performed and 
its use in the practice of law, which will inevitably also 
have an impact upon theories of the law.  
 
Future research is needed to explore in greater detail 
the manner and means by which AI-enablement will 
occur in the law along with the potential for both 
positive and adverse consequences. Autonomous 
AILR is likely to materially impact the effort, theory, 
and practice of AAI, including as a minimum playing 
a notable or possibly even pivotal role in such 
advancements. 
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